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The Legal Construction of Gender 
I. Introduction 
A. Statement of Purpose 
Concepts of sex and gender pervade our legal system at all levels. The criminal law, for 
example, defines certain offenses in terms of the sex of the parties. Thus rape is traditionally 
defined as a crime committed by a man upon a woman,' and sodomy laws expressly or in practice 
proscribe certain forms of conduct only if they are engaged in by a man and a man, or a woman and 
a woman.' A great number of civil liberties actions also center on sexual categories, as in past 
voting rights struggled and in present-day sex-based discrimination claim^.^ 
These are merely a few of the most obvious examples of the prevalence of binary sexual 
categories in ow legal framework, a phenomenon so recognizable that it could probably go without 
saying.' However, the law has rarely attempted an explicit definition of the categories of "male" 
7 
and "female" upon which so much reliance is placed. The distinction has effectively been regarded 
as self-evident. 
The question of who is male and who is female under the law nonetheless has analytical 
significance. Further, it has important consequencesin terms of social norms enforced both directly 
and indirectly through legal mechanisms: a gendered society insists that males conform to 
S e e  65 AM. JUR. 2DRape $5 1-1.5 (1997). 
'See, e.g., TEX. P ~ A L  CODE ANN. 5 21.06(a) (West 1997) ("A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate 
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."). 
' See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's Sufiage Movement, 49 VAND. L. REV. 657 
(1996). 
' See generally Katherine M .  Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex 
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
But see, e.g., Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-Shijtrs, Masqueraders, and Subversives: An Argument for the Liberation 
of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 220-21 (1997) (dixussing "renewed interest in 
asserting the malelfemale binary" given the actual instability of the categorical model of two discrete, muhlally 
exclusive sexes). 9 
standards of "masculinity," and females to those of "femininity." Those who exhibit gender 
atypicalitiesmay be subject to legally permitted discriminationor to outright legal sanction? 
The existence of biologically, psychologically and socially transgendered persons 
challenges commonplace notions about "the sexes." The entry of transgendered persons and their 
concerns into the legal arena has forced the law on occasion to examine its usually implicit 
assumptions about sex and gender. This paper explores the following questions: is sex truly an 
"immutable characteristic" for all legal purposes? If not, at what point and under what 
circumstances does the law acknowledge a change from one sex to the other? This paper also 
examines the legal enforcement of gendered social norms. Such norms are frequently at odds with 
personal experience, and all of us may be subjected to legal scrutiny of our gender perf~rmance.~ 
r' B. Discussion of Terms 
Although the terms "sex" and "gender" are often used interchangeably by the courts, it is 
frequently useful to distinguish between the two concepts. This paper will use "sex" to refer to the 
principally biological characteristics which determine a person's status as male or female. 
"Gender," in turn, will be used to refer to the social characteristics associated with each sex, 
expressed in expectations regarding dress, occupation and other behavioral traits.8 As Justice 
Antonin Scalia has observed, "[tlhe word 'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of 
' See discussion infa Part 111. 
S e e  Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, QyRes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflarion of "Sex." "Gender," 
and 'Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Lmv and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3,48 (1995); see also Shafiqullah, 
supra note 5, at 224-25. 
n. 8 I See Valdes, supra note 7, at 21-22, for a more detailed inh.oductionto the distinct concepts of sex and gender, and to 
the wnflationof the two. 
cultural or attitudinalcharacteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)distinctive to the sexes. 
That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male.'' 
Sex assignment typically occurs at the time of a person's bid, based upon the attending 
physician's anatomical assessment of the child. In the words of a New York court: 
A child is born. The doctor examines the child, perhaps carefully, perhaps 
only in a perfunctory manner. In any event, the doctor decides that the child is a 
"male." He fills out the birth certificate, which is duly recorded with the 
Department of Health, designating such child as a "male." For statistical purposes, 
and as far as society is concerned, this child is a "male."" 
Ordinarily, this presents no difficulties, though the bid of a hermaphrodite (one with both male 
and female organs) or a pseudo-hermaphrodite (one with female organs that appear to be male) 
sometimes renders an anatomical test inadequate!' As a New York court has observed, "[hlormone 
imbalance, psychiatric disturbances, and physical misdevelopment are among the factors which 
-' 
give rise to the cases of uncertainty of sexual definition in particular individ~als.'"~ 
Modern approaches weigh several biological determinants, many of which are subject to 
medical intervention, to evaluate sex assignments. In addition to anatomy, these include 
chromosomal makeup, reproductive capacity and endocrine levels. Also considered are the 
individual's psychological identity and "acceptability by ~thers ." '~  However, there is wide 
J.E.B. v. Alabamaexrel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,1436n.l (1994)(Scalia,J., dissenting). 
lo In re Anonymous,293 N.Y.S.2d834,836-37 (Civ. Ct. 1968). 
I '  See, e.g., id. at 837. 
l2 In re Anonymous, 3 14 N.Y.S.2d668,669 (Civ. Ct. 1970). 
" Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also Edward S. David, Comment, The Law and 
Transsaua1ism:A FalteringResponse to a Concep~ualDilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288,290-291 (1975): 
A listing of the recognizedindiciarelevant to the sex classificationof an individual would include the 
following: 
1. Sex chromosomeconstitution. 
2. Gonadal sex. 
disagreement as to the importance of each factor. Sex assignment by anatomy carries presumptive 
validity at the time of an individual's birth, but .not necessarily following elective surgical 
intervention. In such cases, to determine "true" sex, some decision-makers have directly or 
indirectly privileged a chromosomal test!4 Others, asserting that reliance upon any one factor can 
be misleading, suggest that conflicting factors must be balanced in some way.I5 Commentators 
have advocated a presumption in favor of an individual's psychological identity, regardless of 
physical chara~teristics!~ Finally, some authorities have looked to the "harmonization" of anatomy 
and psychologicalidentity!' 
The non-biological factors in this calculus, psychological and social identity, are really 
questions of gender. Francisco Valdes has persuasively analyzed the relationship of sex and gender 
0. as a "deductive" and "intransitive" paradigm in ow present culture and legal system!' By 
"deductive," he means that gender categorization follows presumptively from one's sex assignment. 
Intransitivity concerns society's expectation that each sex correlate uniformly with one "correct" 
3. Sex hormonal pattern. 
4. Internal sex organs other than gonads. 
5. External genitalia. 
6. Secondarysexual characteristics. 
7. Apparent sex (the sex others presume you are and therefore the sex role in which 
you are reared). 
8. Psychological sex (the sex you consciously feel yourself to be). Also called 
"gender identity." 
I' See, e.g., i n  re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828,830,832 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987). It should be noted that courts emphasizinga 
chromosomal "test" have rarely relied upon actual laboratory analysis of an individual'schromosome pattern. Instead, 
as in Ladrack they infer that a given pattern (corresponding to external genitalia) existed at the time of the person's 
birth, and presume that this pattern has not in fact changed. 
l6  See, e.g., David, supra note 13, at 292. 
"See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834,837 (Civ. Ct. 
,--. 1968). 
gender: "gender's manifest fluidity Wong the populace . . . is adamantly denied and consistently 
repressed by dominant sexlgender forces."19 
Despite the existence of gender intransitivity as a social principle, as Valdes' observation 
suggests, a significant minority of the population consistently refuses or fails to comply with gender 
norms. Transgendered people are those who deliberately cultivate a social identity in the 
"opposite" gender, that is to say, in the gender which does not correspond to their sex assignment at 
birth. Others may simply be "gender atypi~al.''~ Aggressive women, for example, or men with 
long hair or delicate mannerisms, may be viewed as inappropriate in their social behavior. In fact, 
"cross-dressing," or transvestism, has been given a clinical and sometimes even a criminal 
Transsexualismhas been defined in clinical terms as "[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which ,, 
a person feels persistently uncoinfortable about his or her anatomical sex."" It concerns the belief 
that one's physical identity (sex assignment) does not accurately reflect one's psychological identity 
(gender). Late twentieth-century advancements in medical technology, in the form of hormone 
therapy and "sex reassignment" surgical techniques, have enabled transsexuals to seek "treatment" 
for their "dysphoria."' The availability of such "sex change" procedures, which temporarily or 
l9 id 
"See id. at 25-26. 
'' See discussion infa Part 1II.A. 
THE AMERlCAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA~ONEN~LOPEDIAOF MEDICINE 1006 (1989), cited in Farmer v. Breman, 5 1 1 
U.S. 825,829 (1994). 
See David, supra note 13, at 293 (citations omitted): 
The treatment procedure is complex and a course of treatment usually lasts several years in 
an active phase and continues for many years of hormonal maintenance. The basic stages involve 
using hormones to effect the desired secondary sexual characteristics and surgical alteration to 
change the genitals. The surgical technique is most successful in changing anatomical males to 
females. The male organs are removed and an artificial vagina constructed, leaving the patient 
A 6 
permanently alter some but not all of the biological components of is responsible for the 
emergence of litigation to resolve individuals' sex status. 
C. Summary ofAnalysis 
This paper reviews the resolution of sexual and gender identity questions in a selected 
variety of legal contexts. First, it examines U.S. jurisdictions' willingness to provide legal 
documentation of a change in sexual or gender identity in the form of modified birth certificates 
andfor court-ordered changes of name." Many states have made statutory provision for the 
issuance of birth certificates, under carefully prescribed circumstances, designating a new sex. A 
number of jurisdictions have devised ad hoe administrative or judicial procedures for the issuance 
of "corrected" or "amended" b i d  certificates to some transsexuals, while still others have refused 
.P~ to allow for any such compromise. Though concerned with the prospect of "fraud" upon the 
courts have frequently accomodated the wishes of transsexuals desiring a change of name 
to one associatedwith their adopted gender. In the absence of legislativeaction, however, the same 
courts have been reluctant to provide declaratory or equivalent relief acknowledging a permanent 
and comprehensive change in sex status. 
capable of normal coitus and even orgasm. While a male organ can be constructed for the female-to. 
male transsexual the result to date is less satisfactory since erection is so far impossible. 
The majority of sources cited in this paper involve male-to-female banssexuals (MVs) rather than female-to-male 
banssexuals (FTMs). For purposes of the discussion, all references to transsexuals should be assumed to relate to 
MTFs unless indicated otherwise. The terms "pre-operative" and "post-operative" will refer to sex (genital) 
reassignmentsurgery, and not to other surgical interventionssuch as breast implants. 
" Surgery, for example, may remove gonads or alter the characteristics of one's genitalia, but it will not affect one's 
chromosomal makeup. Similarly, hormone therapy may alter one's secondary sexual characteristics without regard 
to the presence or absence of particular sexual organs. 
n "See discussion infra Parts 1I.A-B. 
=See, e.g., InreAnonymous,587N.Y.S.2d548,548 (Civ. Ct. 1992). 
7 
Because sex impinges upon so many rights, privileges and obligations in this country:' 
courts and other entities have nonetheless been called upon to determine the legal sex of 
transsexuals for the purposes of a given case. Disputed marriages are an especially important area 
in which such a finding must be made, and this paper looks closely at marital controversies 
involving  transsexual^.^^ With only one unambiguous exception, U.S. courts have not recognized 
changes in sex for marital purposes. At the same time, many transsexuals may have succeeded in 
manying under their adopted identities, without ever having encountered legal challenge. 
This paper also examines at some length the classification of prisoners in our nations' sex- 
segregated penal systems.29 Although formal policies regarding transsexuals exist in some 
jurisdictions, placement decisions are typically made without such guidance and are consequently 
inconsistent. Pre-operative transsexual prisoners have occasionally been placed in women's 
-, 
prisons. More frequently, though they may be granted continued access to.female hormones and 
"women's" clothing, they are placed in men's facilities. Either solution has difficulties. In men's 
prisons in particular,transsexuals have been vulnerable both to sexual assault by other inmates and 
to the abuses of "protective" segregation from the rest of the prison population. 
The prisoner cases most vividly illustrate the strain which transgenderedrealities place on a 
legal system invested in binary sexual divisions. Although the system has shown some limited 
17 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 331 N.Y.S.2dat 669-70: 
The results which may be gained by societal acceptance, if such were to occur, are manifest. 
Among these are retirement at the age of 62 instead of age 65 under the rules and regulationsof the 
Social Security Administration, improved ratings for life insurance purposes, the automatic right of 
exclusion from jury duty, possible marital benefits and rights of inheritance which differ, in some 
States and nations, according to the sex of the person. 
Although many of these distinctions between "the" sexes are no longer made, this l i t  of sex- l ied  benefits suggests 
the pervasive importance that sexual classifications have held in our legal system. 
- 
', 
lg See discussion infa Part 1I.C. 
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flexibility in dealing with persons who have succeeded in harmonizing their physical and 
psychological identities through surgical intervention, it remains largely hostile to "lesser" forms of 
gender non-conformity. The second major subsection of this paper explores some of the 
manifestations of such hostility. It discusses criminal prohibitions against "cross-dressing" and 
reviews the enforcement of sex-based double standards in employment, prisons and schools,fO 
devoting special attention to Title VII jurisprudence involving transsexual and other gendered (as 
opposed to sex-based) claims!' The courts' persistent refusal to extend Title VII protections to 
sexual minoritie? has served at times to prevent even the slightly gender atypical from obtaining 
redress against employment discrimination. Some states, however, have chosen to provide greater 
protectionsthan those offered under federal law. 
A Ultimately, the law tolerates the existence of a legal limbo for tran~sexuals?~ This limbo 
has many contours, and is based upon society's continued investment in a binary model of sex and 
gender. This model also ensures that other forms of gender atypicalitywill continue to be regulated 
through legal and other mechanisms. At the same time, limbo represents a degree of accomodation 
with gender ambiguity. 
11. Legal Recognition of SexIGender Identity Changes 
The most immediate, practical legal difficulty confronting a transsexual is the probable 
incongruity between her chosen social identity and her personal documents. These include 
" See discussion infa Part I1.D. 
"See discussion infra Parts IILA, B. 
" See discussion infa Part II1.C. 
l2 These sexual minorities would include, for example, lesbians, gay men and bisexuals as well as pre- and post- 
operative transsexuals. 
,- 
I3 See Jeannine S. Haag and Tami L. Sullinger, Tramsaua/s in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 
Mo. L. REV. 236 (1971). 
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passports, driver's licenses, professional licenses, and birth and baptismal records. Since birth 
certificates are required for the issuance of most other personal identification documents, and may 
facilitate the issuance of marriage licenses:4 they are central to the establishment of a new legal 
identity. Changes of name (i.e., from a typically "male" name to a typically "female" name) also 
play an important role. Some vital records authorities have adopted formal or informal policies on 
the administrative level allowing transsexuals to obtain birth certificates with a new name andlor 
sex designation?' It is likely that many transsexuals have benefited from these provisions and 
made virtually unnoticed transitions into legal womanhood. A growing number of states have, by 
statute, expressly authorized the issuance of new or amended birth  certificate^!^ Not surprisingly, 
however, birth certificate issuance and legal sex have become objects of litigation in others. 
A. Birth Certificates: Change of Sex Designation --, 
Although precise data are difficult to obtain," a number of states are known to have 
issued new or amended birth certificates to post-operative transsexuals outside of a specific 
statutory or judicial mandate. Ladrach, for example, asserts that "twelve states [beyond three at 
the time with specific statutes] have permitted a post-operative change of sex designation on 
birth rewrd~."~' The states are not named. David cites earlier, although conflicting, sources 
which indicate that either fifteen or twenty-five states had done so by about 1973. He also 
See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828,831 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987): 
It seems obvious to the court that if a state permits such a change of sex on the b i  certificate of 
a post-operative transsexual, either by statute or administrative ruling, then a marriage license, if 
requested, must issue to such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled. 
35See discussion infra, text accompaning notes 41,54. 
"See infa note 55. 
37 0, Because hanssexualism is a new area . . . legal reactions in many cases take place below the levels reported in 
the standard literature.'' David, supra note 13, at 301. This observation remains valid over two decades later. T 
observes that four states were omitted from updated versions of one of the lists. "Were favorable 
decisions accomplished for the first few applicants, perhaps in dealing with a low level clerk, and 
then, with a few more applicants and a little publicity, did the door close?"39 Legislative 
guidance is a prerequisite for stability in this area4' 
New York's experience illustrates the variety and changeability of administrative 
approaches to this issue. At some time prior to October 1965, the appropriate authority in New 
York City (specifically, the Director of the Bureau of Records and Statistics of the Department of 
Health) is known to have issued amended birth certificates to three  transsexual^.^' Subsequently, 
however, the Director sought guidance from the Board of Health in formulating a policy on the 
subject? The Board in turn solicited recommendationsfrom the New York Academy of Medicine, 
,-. 
which concluded inter alia that "male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while 
ostensibly females" and expressed its opposition to changes of sex on birth certificates. The Board 
unanimously endorsed the Academy's recommendations, and passed a resolution on October 13, 
1965 stating that "it is the sense of the Board of Health that the Health Code not be amended to 
provide for a change of sex on birth certificates in cases of transsexuals.'" The succeeding 
Director's consequent refusal to issue amended birth certificates to transsexuals survived challenge 
in Anonymous v. Weiner. 
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 830. The three states cited were Arizona, Louisiana and Iltiois. 
39 David, supra note 13, at 301. 
" CJ Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832 ("[Ilt is this court's opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is 
to be the public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-operative transsexuals."). 
" See Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319,324 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
,n "Id at 321. 
"Id at 321-22. 
11 , 
The Academy recommendations cited in Anonymous v. Weiner continue to be regarded 
favorably by some courts:4 but have been criticized in others, including its own!' In any event, the 
city Health Code eventually was amended in 1971. The new policy represented a compromise: 
upon presenting proof of reassignment surgery and a court-ordered name change, post-operative 
transsexuals would now receive a birth certificate with no sex designation at all. This policy too 
withstood attempts to compel the Director to record an actual change from male to female? 
Effectively, the new policy allowed the Bureau of Records and Statistics, as well as reviewing 
courts, to avoid responsibility for making an official determinationof an applicant's sex. 
A jurisdiction's receptiveness to amendiig birth certificates for transsexuals depends to 
some degree on the nature of its existing vital statistics laws. Most states have statutory 
provisions allowing for some types of birth certificate modification. John Holloway has ,,, 
observed that such provisions generally fall into two categories?' "Correction" statutes pennit 
the amendment of birth certificates upon a showing that the original records were in some way 
incorrect.48 "Alteration" statutes, in turn, may allow for more general modification of birth 
record data.49 The type of statute prevailing in a given state can have practical consequences for 
transsexuals seeking to document their adopted sexlgender identity: 
See, e.g., Larlrach, 513 N.E.2d at 830; Hartin v. Director, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515,517 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
" See Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99,102 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834,838 (Civ. 
Ct. 1968) ("This Court is in complete disagreement with the conclusion reached by the learned committee."). 
46 See Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 101-102; Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18 (citing New York City 
Health Code 5 207.05(a)(5)). 
"John P. Holloway, Transsexuals - Their LegalSex, 40 U .  COW. L. REV. 282,288 (1968). 
48 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 5 191.028@) (West 1998): "An amendiig certificate may be filed 
to complete or correct a [birth] record that is incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate. . . ." 
' 9  See, e.g., S.D. COD~FIED LAWS g 34-25-51 (Michie 1997): "A certificate or record registered under this chapter ? 
may be amended in accordance with regulations adopted by the secretary of health. . . ." 
The surgically converted transsexual will have a far better chance of obtaining the 
amendment or change of his birth certificate in those states which have alteration 
- 
statutes than in those whose statutes limit changes to "corrections." In the latter, the 
burden is on the transsexual of proving that the original registrationwas erroneous?' 
The Ladrach court, for example, explicitly premised its denial of the petitioner's application for a 
new birth certificate on the observation that no error had been made initially. "It is the position of 
this court that the Ohio correction of birth record statute. . . is strictly a 'correction'type statute. . . . 
There was no error in the designationof Edward FranklinLadrach as a 'Boy' in the category of 'sex' 
on his birth ~ertificate.'~' 
Where the statutes are ambiguous, courts have taken varied approaches. In K. v. Health 
Divisioq the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's order directing the Health Division to 
issue the FTM petitioner a birth certificate indicating his new name and sex.S2 The state Supreme 
n 
Court overmledthe order, however. 
The majority of the Court of Appeals. . . appears to view a "birth certificate" 
as a record of facts as they presently exist, and thus as a record subject to change by 
order of a court by the issuance of a "new birth certificate" upon proof of any 
subsequent changes in the facts as recorded in the original birth certificate, including - 
subsequent changes in sex. 
In our opinion, it is not for this court to decide which view is preferable. On 
the contrary, we hold that this is a matter of public policy to be decided by the 
Oregon legislature? 
In contrast, a federal court in Connecticut has held that the state must show a substantial state 
interest in refusing to amend a transsexual's birth certificate, in order to survive an Equal Protection 
Holloway, supra note 47, at 289. 
" In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987). See also Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 432 
(Ohio Ct. App.), cff!. denied 577 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio 1991) ("[lln the contemplation of Ohio jurisprudence, one's 
gender at birth [sic] is one's gender throughout life."). 
" K. v. Health Division, 552 P.2d 840,845 (Or. App. 1976), rev'd 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977). 
l 3  T 
challenge. Connecticut's Commissioner of Health had previously amended birth certificates for 
other reasons, without express statutory authority?' 
Twenty-me states and the District of Columbia now have statutes formally authorizing 
post-operative transsexuals to obtain new or amended birth certificates designating them as 
members of their adopted sex. Each of these states, at a minimum, requires some evidence that a 
genital reassignment has been successfully completed:' Most of them also require a court order 
and/or proof of a legal name ~ h a n g e ? ~  The latter requirement appears to serve no substantial 
purpose beyond soothing the public, by encouraging transsexuals to maximize the congruence 
between their post-surgical anatomy and the social indices of gender identity." 
K. V. Health Division, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977) (footnote omitted). Oregon's vital statistics laws now 
make explicit provision for the issuance of amended b i i  certificates to post-operative transsexuals. See infa note 
55. 
'' Damell v. Lloyd, 395 F.Supp. 1210, 1213-14 (D. Conn. 1975). 
" See ALA. CODE 5 22-9A-19(d) (1997); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 36-326(A)(4) (West 1997); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE 5 103425 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 25-2-1 15(4) (West 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. 9 6- 
217(d) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. 5 3 1-10-23(e) (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (Michie 1997); 
IOWA CODE ANN. 5 144.23(3) (West 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 213.121(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 5 62 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN., 5 4-214(b)(5) (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 
46, 5 13(e) (West 1998); MCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 333.281(~) (West 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. 5 193.215(9) (West 
1998); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 71-604.01 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 26:s-40.12 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. 9 24- 
14-25i.D) (Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 130A-118@)(4) (1997); OR. RFV. STAT. 5 432.235(4) (1997); UTAH 
CODE ANN. 5 26-2-11 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. 5 32.1-269(E) (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. 55 69.15(4)@), (c) 
(West 1998); but see TENN. CODE ANN.  5 68-3-203(d) (1997) ("The sex of an individual will not be changed on the 
original certificate of b i i  as a result of sex change surgery."). 
' 6  For a typical statute of this k i d ,  see GA. CODE ANN. 5 3 1-10-23(e); but see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 338- 
17.7(aX4)(B) (requiring only a physician's affidavit that surgery has made the registrant's original sex designation 
incorrect). 
" Such statutes ask transsexuals, in effect, to embrace gender stereotypes and to "erase" a specifically transgendered 
identity, see Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories, a n d h ,  5 AM. U. 
J. GENDER & L. 343, 373 (1997), as a prerequisite to legal recognition. At the very least, they reflect a belief that r" 
changing one's name can be as radical or necessary an intervention as changing one's anatomy. 
n 
B. Name Changes 
Many people, of course, choose to adopt a new name without any need of prompting from 
the state. An individual is generally free in our legal tradition to assume a new name at will.58 
However, judicial orders of change of name have certain  advantage^:^ and they are frequently 
sought by transsexuals seeking to facilitate the creation and social acceptance of their adopted 
gender identity. On the whole, both pre- and post-operative transsexuals have obtained legally 
recognized changes of name with comparative ease. 
Some jurisdictions, including those hostile to birth certificate sex designation changes, have 
articulated a policy favoring the grant of a court-ordered name change in the absence of clearly 
fraudulent intent.@ Other courts have a expressed a more general, broadly defined concern with 
!'7 fraud, however. New York courts have occasionally required applicants for a court-ordered name 
change to supply outside documentation of their transsexual status and the "irreversibility" of their 
decision to live as a female. 
The court's controlling responsibility is to insure against the possibility that 
its order will lend legal credence to confusing or misleading the public in its 
dealings with petitioner. 
Without a competent medical and psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, 
granting the relief requested may be contrary to the public interest as well as 
harmful to petitioner'spresent mental status!' 
" "Under common law, a person may use any name at will as long as there is no fraud, misrepresentation or 
interference with the rights of others." In re Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548. 
' 9  "The advantages of obtaining court approval of a change of name are that the court order sets a defmite date on 
which the new name is to be assumed, it gives the name change an 'aura of propriety and official sanction' and 
makes it a matter of public record." Id. 
60See, e.8, I n  re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987) ("The court believes that so long as there is no 
intent to defraud creditors or deceive others and the applicant has acted in good faith,.then the petition. should be 
,-, granted.") 
In re Anonymous, 582 N.Y.S.2d 941,941 (Civ. Ct. 1992). See also In re Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548. 
'5 , 
Upon receipt of such proof, the courts have had no further difficulty grantingthe request for a name 
change:' Nonetheless, they remain reluctant to take a firm stand regarding the applicant's ultimate 
status. More than one New York name change case contains language to the effect that "the order 
shall not be used or relied upon by petitioner as any evidence or judicial determination that the sex 
of the petitioner has in fact been changed.I6' 
C. Marriage Rights 
Undoubtedly, many marriages involving transsexuals are contracted and consummated 
without ever reaching the attention of the courts.@ Where the validity of such a marriage has been 
litigated, it is often in the context of divorce or support proceedings; presumably, the issue would 
never have arisen in the absence of a conflict between the spouses themselves. In at least one case, 
though, the Army initiated legal action against a couple in regard to their allegedly invalid 
marriage, despite the fact that it had never been challenged in a state forum!' When such marriages 
are tested in court, however, they are highly unlikely to be recognized. Furthermore, marriage 
licenses are unlikely to be issued to known transsexuals seeking to many opposite their adopted 
sex.& 
6"ee In re Rivera, 627 N.Y.S.2d 241, 241 (Civ. Ct. 1995) (granting petitioner's change of name from William 
Rodriguez Rivera to Veronica Rodriguez). Rivera was the previously unsuccessful petitioner in In re Anonymous, 
587 N.Y.S.2d 548. 
63 In re Anonymous, 3 14 N.Y.S.2d 668,670 (Civ. Ct. 1970). See also, e.g, Rivera, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 241. 
" "Transsexuals are in fact gening married and doing so with ease!' David, supra note 13, at 324. 
65 Von Hoftburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Ci. 1980). 
66 Hereinafter, for lack of a more accurate yet still economical term, these actual and attempted unions will be 
referred to as "transsexual marriages." 
With the fragile exception of Hawaii:' U.S. jurisdictions have held unanimously that 
marriage is the legal union of one man with one woman.68 In the typical case, then, the validity 
of a transsexual marriage hinges upon the question of whether or not the bride is lawfully a 
"woman." With one exception, courts confkonting this question have declined to offer such 
recognition. 
The first U.S. case to address transsexual marriage leaves the question largely open. In 
Anonymous v. ~ n o n ~ m o u r , 6 ~  the plaintiff, a non-commissionedofficer in the U.S. Army, sought a 
declaratory judgment regarding his marital status. The parties had met "on a street in Augusta, 
Georgia" and, shortly afterward, took part in a marriage ceremony in Texas. The intoxicated 
plaintiff did not discover until after the ceremony that his bride had male organs. According to the 
,-' 
court, "[hle immediately left the bed, 'got drunk some more' and went to the bus station.'" Within 
a month he was sent overseas; in his absence, the defendant underwent reassignment.surgery. 
Based on these facts, the court found "that the defendant was not a female at the time of the 
marriage ceremony'"' and that the ceremony itself was thus "a n~llity.'"~ ~ l though the court 
" Litigation in Hawaii may soon lead to the recognition of same-sex marriages. See Baehr v. Miiie, No. CIV. 91- 
1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (fmding no proof of compelling state interest which 
would be prejudiced by permitting same-sex marriage). However, Hawaii voters will consider a state constimtional 
amendment in November 1998 which would discourage or prevent such recognition. See Mark Strasser, Statutory 
Conshrction, Equal Protection, and the Amendment Process: On Romer, Hunter, and Efforts to Tame Baehr, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 739,739 (1997). 
"See, e .g ,  Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 @.C. 1995); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971). In anticipation of an outcome favorable to same-sex couples in Hawaii, 
Congress and a number of states have enacted legislation aimed at avoiding recognition of same-sex marriages from 
other jurisdictions. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); 1997 Ark. Acts 
144; 1996 Ga. Laws 1025 5 1; 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 334 5 1; see Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: 
On Acts in Dejnse of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U .  PITT. L. REV. 279 (1997). 
,P, Id. at 499. 
expressed doubt as to whether surgery could "change a person into a true female,'"' it did not 
propose a definitive answer to that question. 
A subsequent New York case74 also found invalid a transsexual marriage involving an FTM 
husband, determining that a divorce was inappropriate because the parties could never have been 
married legally. Reassignment surgery had taken place prior to the wedding date, but the wurt 
found this insufficient to convert the defendant legally from female to male. Although the same 
court had earlier permitted the defendant "to assume the name Mark in place and stead of 
Mar~ha,"~' facilitating his social identificationas a male, it was unwilling to recognize a change of 
sex for marital purposes. The court expressed particular concern about the defendant's lack both of 
male gonads and of a penis: "Apparently, hormone treatments and surgery have not succeeded in 
supplying the necessary apparatus to enable defendant to function as a man for purposes of T 
pr~creation.'"~ More recently, an Ohio court expressed its opinion that "true sex" coincides 
permanently with the anatomical determination made at b i d ,  and called upon the legislature to 
m h i s  court concludes that there is not authority in Ohio for the issuance of a 
marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operativemale to female 
transsexual person and a male person. 
. . . it is this court's opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if 
it is to be the public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post- 
operative transsexuals." 
The court clearly hesitated to set a precedent for transsexual marriage. 
nId. at 501. 
Id. at 500. 
" B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
"Id at714. 
' 6  Id at 717. 
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A federal court, when confronted with the issue of transsexual marriage, altogether avoided 
reaching the merits of the case.78 The details of Von Hoflurg nonetheless warrant consideration. 
The marriage question arose within the context of a proceeding challengingthe plaintiffs dismissal 
from the U.S. Army. The plaintiff, formerly known as Marie Sode, had manied a Kristian Von 
Hoffburg while on active duty in the state of Alabama. Subsequently, Kristian Von Hoffburg 
obtained a dependent military identificationcard, and Marie Von Hoffburg applied for and received 
a Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) at the rate for married persons. The Army began a criminal 
investigation, however, after learning that Kristian Von Hoffburg was an FTM transsexual and 
Army veteran previously known as Linda Bowers. Following the investigation,the Army declared 
the marriage a nullity, terminated the plaintiffs BAQ payments, and eventually ordered her 
,-- discharge on the grounds of "homosexual tendencie~.'"~ The elimination board specifically 
determined that "Kristian L. Von Hoffburg is a biological female,'"' although the validity of the 
marriage was not challenged withii the Alabama courts." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declined to resolve the matter, instead dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies? 
In each of the foregoing cases, the courts resisted making a definitive finding regarding a 
transsexual's legal sex for marriage purposes. In the marriage context, only one court has 
In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828,832 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987). 
Von Hoftburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633,636 (5th Cir. 1980). 
"Id. at 635-36. 
'O Id at 636 n.7. 
7, " Id at 635 n.2. 
"Id at 640,641. 
conclusively resolved the matter in favor of a transsexual party. In M.T. v. J. T,s3 a New Jersey 
court affirmed a lower court's order of support and maintenance against a husband in favor of his 
transsexual spouse. The court did not dispute "the fundamental premise in this case that a lawful 
marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two persons of the opposite sex,"84 
but instead found that the wife had legally become female through irreversible medical 
Unlike the B v. B court, which stressed procreative function, the M T. v. J. T. court was 
impressed with the plaintiffs sexual capacity. The court observed that she could no longer function 
sexually as a male, while noting aff ia t ively that she had acquired a fully serviceable "artificial" 
vagina. In fact, it offered an elaborate descriptionof M.T.'s post-surgicalanatomy: 
The examination of plaintiff before the operation showed that she had a penis, 
scrotum and testicles. After the operation she did not have those organs but had a 
vagina and labia which were "adequate for sexual intercourse" and could function as 
any female vagina, that is, for "traditional penilelvaginal intercourse." The 
"artificial vagina" constructed by such surgery was a cavity, the walls of which are 
lined initially by the skin of the penis, often later taking on the characteristics of 
normal vaginal mucosa; the vagina, though at a somewhat different angle, was not 
really different from a natural vagina in size, capacity and "the feeling of the walls 
around it." Plaintiff had no uterus or cervix, but her vagina had a "good cosmetic 
appearance" and was "the same as a normal female vagina after a hysterectomy.'66 
The court explicitly rejected the hypothesis that "true sex" is determined irrevocably at birth, 
holding instead that a transsexual's sex must be recognized according to the congruence of anatomy 
and gender made possible by successful surge~y.~' 
" 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976). 
"Id. at 207. 
" I d .  at211. 
s6 Id 
" I d .  at 209. 
:- 
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The New Jersey court's willingness to embrace M. T. v. J. T.'s transsexual plaintiff and her 
claim for spousal suppod8 may be due in part to the clear absence of fraud in the case. The record 
indicated that M.T. and her husband had lived together for a number of years prior to their 
marriage, that the husband was fully aware of her "condition" during that time, and that he himself 
had paid for her reassignment surgery. Their wedding took place over a year after the operation, 
and the husband continued to support her for another two years before abandoning their shared 
home.89 This contrasts sharply with the circumstances of Anonymous v. Anonymous and B v. B, in 
which the plaintiffs each felt that they had been deceived about the sex of their transsexual 
spouses?O The MT.  court found the prospect of fiaud far less troubling. "The potential for 
fiaud. . . is effectively countered bythe apt observation of the trial judge here: 'The transsexual is 
." 
not committing a fraud upon the public. In actuality she is doing her utmost to remove any false 
facade.""' 
D. Prisoner ClassiJcafionand Placement 
The determination of a person's official sex has presented a vexing problem for penal 
authorities in the exercise of their responsibility over transgendered inmates. Such prisoners are 
regarded as especially vulnerable to assault within male prisons, and as a threat to security andlor 
privacy in female facilities. At the same time, the segregation of transsexual inmates from- the 
general prison population may raise Eighth Amendment concerns. The Eighth Amendment has 
See id at 21 1: "Such recognition will promote the individual's quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while 
in no way dissewing any societal interest, principle of public order or precept of morality." 
89 id at 205. The court's decision may also have been influenced by principles of estoppel. 
90 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (Sup. Ct. 
1974). The Army's position in Yon Hoflurg v. Alaander also indicates its concern that the plaintiff had sought 
P marital benefits dishonestly. See 615 F.2d 633,635 (5th Cir. 1980). 
21 , 
also been invoked by prisoners seeking access to hormone therapy or other treatment for their 
"gender dysphoria'82 Because of their effect on secondary sex characteristics and indices of 
gender, decisions regardiig medical and psychia~c  treatment remain intimately involved with 
prisoner classificationpolicies. 
Prison officials may not lawfully act with "deliberate indifference" towards an inmate's 
serious medical need. Under Estelle v. Gamble, to do so constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth ~mendment?' Courts in several jurisdictions have recognized 
transsexuality as a serious medical condition subject to the Estelle rule.% However, they have also 
held that "although prison oficials must provide treatment to address the medical needs of 
transsexual prisoners, the law [does] not require prison officials to administer estrogen or provide 
any other particular treatment:"' Transsexual inmates, typically pre-operative, have consequently 
,-,, 
had mixed success in compelling prisons to provide them with estrogen therapy. 
Many prisoners have been denied access to female hormones in favor of alternative 
"treatments" for gender dysphoria. Thus, for example, the plaintiff in Supre (whose testicles had 
been surgically removed following several attempts at "self-mutilation")was initially scheduled for 
testosterone replacement therapy and mental health treatment rather than the estrogen therapy she 
requested% The plaintiffsrequest for female hormones in Lamb v. Maschner was similarly denied; 
" On gender dysphoria, see generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532-38 (4th 
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
" 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Ci. 
1988); Meriwether v. Faukner, 821 F.2d 408,413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 935 (1987). 
9' Brown, 63 F.3d at 970, citing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958,963 (10th Cir. 1986). n 
% 792 F.2d at 960. 
,'-' 
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her placement in a State Security Hospital was found to be constitutionally satisfactory evidence of 
mental treatment? 
In addition, prison officials have frequently attempted to evade their constitutional 
obligations to transgendered inmates by arguing that a given prisoner is not a "true transsex~al. '~~ 
Thus, in many of the lawsuits, opposing experts will argue fine diagnostic points purporting to 
distinguish (for example) the transsexual from the transvestite from the sufferer of "gender identity 
disorder of adolescence or adulthood, nontranssexual type" (GIDAANT)? According to the 
diagnostic manuals, GIDAANT differs from transsexuality in that the patient does not suffer from 
the same "persistent preoccupation" with altering her primary and secondary sex  characteristic^!^^ 
"Mere" transvestism or "tmnsvestic paraphilia," in turn, involves crossdressing as sexual 
r stimulation rather than as "a form of confident self-expression of female identity.""' The 
constitutional safeguards for transsexual prisoners rely heavily on the technicalities of a clinical, 
disease-orientedmodel of their gender identity. 
Despite the narrowness of these protections, at least one court has been willing to require 
prisons to provide estrogen to a properly diagnosed transsexual inmate. In Phillips, the court 
granted the plaintiff smotion for a preliminary injunction ordering corrections officials to continue 
633 F.Supp. 351,354 @. Kansas 1986). 
98 See, e.g., Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358, 1362-63 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 
73 1 F.Supp. 792,795 (W.D. Mich. 1990), a f d  932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991). 
99 See Phillips, 73 1 F.Supp. at 796, citing the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d 
ed., rev., 1987) bereinafter DSM-Ill-R] published by the American Psychiatric Association. The court held that a 
GIDAANT diagnosis, like transsexuality, was sufficient to establish "serious medical need." Id. at 800. 
DSM-111-R, supra note 99, at 76-77. As a clinical category, GIDAANT has since been subsumed, with 
Transsexualism, into the more general "Gender Identity Disorder." DSM-N, supra note 92, at 532-38. 
lo' Long, 877 F.Supp. at 1363. Cf: Star v. Gramley, 815 F.Supp. 276,278 n.2 (C.D. Ilt 1993): ("Gramley further 
/'- notes that the plaintiff is not a transsexual and. has no medically documented need to wear women's clothing."); 
DSM-IV, supra note 92, at 536 (defining "Tranvestic Fetishism"). 
23 q 
her estrogen therapy, which had been interrupted after her incar~eration!~' The plaintiffs case in 
Phillips had a heightened degree medical urgency, which the court took into consideration, because 
she had been receiving estrogen prescriptions for approximately sixteen years prior to her arrest and 
conviction. She had also undergone various procedures short of genital reassignment, such as 
electrolysis and breast implant surgery, to enhance her female appearance. Her withdrawal from 
estrogen caused a variety of adverse effects, including vomiting, discomfort and bruising due to a 
reduction in breast tissue, and depression, as well as the reversal of .  secondary female 
 characteristic^!^' Meriwether involved a very similar plaintiff also undergoing severe estrogen 
withdrawal  symptom^!^ Although that court upheld her right to receive medical treatment 
generally, however, it declined to require estrogen therapy or any other specific form of treatment 
such as reassignment surgery!'' 
.? 
Many transsexual inmates have nonetheless received hormone treatment in prison without 
any court intewention!06 These prisoners may or may not receive permission to wear "female" 
clothing and cosmetics as well.lw Although beneficial to the medical and psychological well-being 
of the affected inmates, such measures also ensure the continued existence of a prison 
subpopulation containing individuals who exhibit female characteristics but often retain full or 
partial male genitalia. In a penal system divided sharply into designated male and female 
731 F.Supp. at 794,801. 
lo' See id at 793-794. 
IW Meriwether v. Faukner, 821 F.2d 408,410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 935 (1987). 
'051d at413. 
Some have also succeeded in obtaining hormones by having them smuggled into prison. See Farmer v. Brennan, 
5 I 1  U.S. 825,829 (1 994). 
Im See. eg., Lucrecia v. Samples, No. C-93-3651-VRW, 1995 WL 630016, at *I (N.D.Ca1. Oct. 16, 1995) 
(permission to wear "female" clothing granted at one male facility and denied at another). 
,n, 
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facilities,'08 this greatly problematizesthe question of prisoner placement. As argued in White, "the 
State has a legitimate interest in not having a male with female breasts in a male prison and in not 
placing persons with functional male genitals in a female prison."'09 
From the existing body of case law, it appears that transsexuals in transition are nearly 
always placed in male rather than female prisons. However, there is a widespread perceptionthat 
such prisoners are particularly vulnerable to, or even invite, sexual assault!1° So far, viable 
solutions to this problem have remained. elusive. Transsexuals assaulted in prison have 
occasionally filed Eighth Amendment suits against guards and officials for their failure to protect 
them from attack!" The very same plaintiffs, though, may raise similar constitutional objections 
when subjected to ostensibly protective segregation!" 
r .  On occasion, pre-operative transsexuals have in fact been placed: in women's prisons!" 
This too has difficulties. In at least one lawsuit, a female prisoner alleged violations of her privacy 
IW TheLumb wurt perceives the matter bluntly: "A male prisoner cannot be housed in a women's prison." Lamb v. 
Maschner, 633 F.Supp. 351,353 @. Kansas 1986). 
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322,327 (8th Cir. 1988), citing Brief of Appellant at 26-27. 
! l o  "Gramley asserts that allowing an inmate to wear women's garments and makeup in an all-male prison could 
provoke andlor promote homosexual activity or assault." Star v. Gramley, 815 F.Supp. 276,278 (C.D. 111. 1993). 
See also Farmer, 51 1 U.S. at 830; Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417; Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358, 1361 (S.D. Iowa 
1995). 
" I  See, e.g., Farmer, 51 1 U.S. at 830. 
'I2 See id at 861 n.1 (Thomas, I., wncurring in the judgment): 
When petitioner was taken out of general prison population for security reasons at USP- 
Lewisburg, he [sic] asserted that he "d[id] not need extra security precautions" and filed suit 
alleging that placing him in solitary confmement was unconstitutional. . . . Petitioner's present 
claim, oddly enough, is that leaving him in general prison population was unconstitutional 
because it subjected him to a risk of sexual assault. 
See also Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417-18 ("Plaintiffs claim that the defendants have deliberately failed to protect her 
from sexual assault is somewhat in conflict with her desire not to remain in administrative segregation.. 
n indefmitely."). 
"'See, e.g., Lucrecia v. Samples, No. (2-93-365 1-VRW, 1995 WL 630016, at '2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 16, 1995). 
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and other constitutional rights based upon her placement with a transsexual cellmate in the county 
jail. 'The cellmate, Cheyenne Lamson, was 6'1" and had anatomically intact male genitalia. She 
had been living for several years as a woman, however, was receiving estrogen treatment, and had 
"virtually no capacity to function sexually as a male.""4 Because the defendant jail officials had 
placed Lamson with female inmates upon the advice of a physician, and because "the contours of 
[the constitutional right to privacy] are not clear when it comes to the determination of where to 
house transsexuals," the conrt held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the 
charge of invasion of privacy. At the same time, it recognized that "[tlhe Jail's solution may not 
have been ideal.""5 
Policy approaches to the treatment and placement of transsexual prisoners may not always 
be formulated in advance!I6 Nonetheless, some prison systems have devised formal guidelines. 
-, 
For example, "[ilt is the policy of the Federal] Bureau of Prisons to maintain the transsexual 
inmate at the level of change existing upon admission to the Bureau."'" It is also federal policy "to 
incarcerate preoperativetranssexuals with prisoners of like biological an apparent reference 
to at-birth anatomical designation. Some states, such as Colorado, have formally studied the 
problem and adopted similar  guideline^!'^ Such policies offer a convenient bright line to 
)I4 Crosby V. Reynolds, 763 F.Supp. 666,667 0. Maine 1991). 
"6 See id at 669: "Jail authorities, obviously, do not frequently address such a quandary; well thought out and 
articulated policies were, therefore, not available." 
#I7 Bureau of Risons Health Service Manual $6803, citedin Cuoco v. Quinlan, No. 91 Civ. 7279 (LMM), 1992 WL 
350755, at $4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1992). 
'I8 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,829 (1994). 
See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 960-61 (10th Cu. 1986) (discussing the "Transsexual Policy Development 0, 
Workshop" conducted in January 1983). 
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/-' 
correctionsoficials faced with the "q~andary"'~~ of where to house a transsexual prisoner. They do 
not resolve the tension between binary sex designations and trangendered reality, however, and 
they do not address the pervasive problem of gendered violence among inmates!21 
111. Gender Atvvicalitv and Legal Pressure to Conform 
The clinical understanding of transsexualityremains heavily invested in the binary, either-or 
model of sex, and in the one-to-one mapping of sex to a corresponding gender!22 Thus, 
transsexuality is understood as simply an inversion of this norm. "A transsexual believes that he is 
the victim of a biologic accident, cruelly imprisoned within a body incompatible with his real 
sexual identity."'23 This helps to explain why courts and legislatures have been slightly more 
receptive to the needs of transsexuals after the completion of reassignment surgery. The 
harmonization of one's physical attributes with one's adopted gender identity restores the illusion of 
P. 
a well-ordered world symmetrically divided into masculine males and feminine females. The 
"gender atypical" - that is, individuals whose social characteristics fail in varying degrees to 
conform to those expected of their sex - upset the tidy boundaries prescribed by such a model. The 
law frequently finds ways to punish gender atypical people for their variance from the norm. More 
passively, it continues to tolerate many forms of private discrimination against transsexuals and 
I w  See supra, note 116. 
12' See Renee, supra note 57, at 383-88, for a proposal advocating the classification and placement of prisoners 
according to a multiple-criterion model of gender identity, rather than according to genital attributes; see also Debra 
Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 27, 44-47 
(1 995). 
The co&s discussion in one of New York's Anonymom cases illustratesthe confusing sex and gender permutations 
exposed by transgendered persons in a binary environment. "[The transsexual's] social sex is is determined by his 
anatomicalsex. But again, by defmition, his psychologicalsex, as distinguishedfiom his anatomicalsex, is that of the 
oppositesex." In re Anonymour, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834,837 (Civ. Ct. 1968). 
A In THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOS~S AND  H HE RAW 1434 (14th ed. 1982), cited in Merimher, 821 F.2d at 412 
n.5. 
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(1 995). 
The co&s discussion in one of New York's Anonymom cases illustratesthe confusing sex and gender permutations 
exposed by transgendered persons in a binary environment. "[The transsexual's] social sex is is determined by his 
anatomicalsex. But again, by defmition, his psychologicalsex, as distinguishedfiom his anatomicalsex, is that of the 
oppositesex." In re Anonymour, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834,837 (Civ. Ct. 1968). 
A In THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOS~S AND  H HE RAW 1434 (14th ed. 1982), cited in Merimher, 821 F.2d at 412 
n.5. 
others. This is especially true in institutional settings such as school, prison and the workplace. 
There are exceptions to the law's approval of institutional bias, however. 
A. Cross-dressing Statutes 
Many jurisdictions have retained criminal prohibitions against "cross-dressing." One such 
ordinance reads: "[alny person who shall appear in a public place . . . in a dress not belonging to 
his or her sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex, . . . shall be fined not less than twenty dollars 
nor more than five hundred dollars for each offense."'24 The language of intentional concealment 
echoes the concern with "kaud" that recurs throughout transgenderjurispmdence. Apparently, the 
law fears that "inappropriate" gender behavior will confuse or mislead the observer as to a person's 
wtrue*o sex.1Z5 For some reason, we are obsessed with knowing in which of two sexual categories 
everyone belongs, and expect gender to signal the answer. 
9 
Cross-dressing statutes have become difficult to enforce against transsexuals, however. In 
City of Columbus v. Zanders, for example, the court found that the defendant, as a "true 
transsexual" subject to irresistible compulsion, could not form the criminal intent required for 
conviction under the Columbus ~rdinance!'~ The Supreme Court of Illinois in Wilson found 
Chicago's ordinance to be unconstitutional as applied to transsexual defendants undergoing pre- 
operativetherapy. It declined, though, to declare the ordiianceunconstitutionalon its face!' 
Iu Municipalcode of the city of Chicago, 6 192-8, cited in City of Chicagov. Wilson, 389N.E.2d 522,523 (Ill. 1978). 
'I' Cf: People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362,365 (Crim. Ct. 1974): "We may accept as a fact that apparently the 
human species is the only one in which true gender can be more or less successfully concealed." 
" 266 N.E.2d 602,603-04 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1970). Aceording to the court, "the true transsexual suffers from a mental 
defect over which he [sic] has little practical control." Id. at 606. 
- 
In reaching these conclusions, the courts revisit the arguments distinguishing "genuine" 
transsexuals from other gender non-conformists. The Simmons court, before finding New York's 
criminal impersonation statute inapplicable to cross-dressing,devoted the first part of its opinion to 
speculation about the defendant's clinical status: 
His accoutrement may mean that he is a transvestite, that is, a person who 
achieves sexual stimulation from cross-dressing. . . . Or he may be a transsexual, 
an individual with the anatomy of one sex, who believes so f m l y  that he belongs to 
the other sex that he is obsessed with a complusion to alter his appearance, social 
status and even his body to conform to the 'rightful' gender. 
However, Simmons may be a pseudotransvestite,'an overt homosexual who 
uses cross-dressing solely for purposes of enticement.' 
Finally, the defendant may fit none of the foregoing descriptions and may 
merely employ dress as a device to facilitate the practice of sodomy for pay!28 
The Zanders court likewise took pains to distinguish its transsexual defendant from homosexuals 
and from tran~vestites!~~ 
A 
Even while ruling in favor of transsexual defendants in cross-dressingcases, then, the courts 
have generally upheld the states' right to criminalize the conduct. The ordinances have been 
defended, for example, as devices to prevent criminal or "inherently antisocial" behavior!30 
Similarly, quoting favorably from Zanders, the court in Simmons held that "[tlhe state has power to 
prohibit cross-dressing when it is associated with criminal misconduct or bears a real and 
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.""' The states retain the 
power to monitor their citizens' clothing choices for gender conformity. 
I" 357 N.Y.S.2dat 363 (internal citations omitted), 
See Zanders, 266 N.E.2dat 603,605. 
City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522,524 (Ill. 1978). See also ZaMkrs, 266 N.E.2d at 604 ("common sense 
and experiencedisclosesthat this ordinance has a real and substantialrelation to the public safety and general welfare"). 
,n 
I" 357 N.Y.S.2dat 365. 
B. Double Standardr in Institutional Settings 
Outside of criminal prosecution, institutions such as prisons and schools also exercise a 
great deal of authority over the clothing and grooming choices of their members (i.e., inmates and 
students). For example, as evident from the discussion above, prisons frequently restrict inmate 
access to cosmetics and "feminine" clothing. Such regulations are defended as matters of 
"legitimate security Schools offer similar rationales for their grooming and dress 
codes, as in Harper v. Edgewood Board of Education: "the school b o d s  dress regulations are 
reasonably related to the valid educational purposes of teaching community values and maintaining 
school discipline.""" 
Security concerns are repeatedly cited in litigation concerning hair-length regulation in the 
prison context. Many state prison systems have grooming standards requiring male inmates to 
;? 
maintain their hair shorter than a given length, typically above the collar?34 State and federal courts 
have flequently upheld these regulations, even weighed against fundamental constitutional interests 
such as freedom of religion!35 Among the penological interests sometimes cited in support of hair 
length measures is that of "reducing homosexual attractiveness of inmates."136 This concern 
'" Star v. Gramley, 815 F.Supp. 276,278 (C.D. Ill. 1993). See also Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358,1366 (S.D. Iowa 
1995); Lamb v. Maschner,633 F.Supp. 351,353 @.Kansas 1986). 
' 655 F.Supp. 1353,1355 (S.D. Ohio 1987), 
'" See, e.g., Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 811, 811 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990) (referring to prison grooming 
regulations in Missouri). 
'" This is a much-litigated area; hair-length regulations have been subjected in particular to recurring challenges by 
Native American, Rastafarian and other inmates who experience them as a burden on the free exercise of their 
religions. Such claims rarely prevail, even where the plaintiffs religious convictions and sincerity are not in 
question. See, e.g., Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1525 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991) (observing that "prisoners have 
been singularly unsuccessful . . . in challenging grooming codes"). 
Swift V. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22,24 (5th Cir. 1992); 
-, 
Harman v. Ohio Dep't of Corrections, 600 N.E.2d 314,316 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
A 
30 
suggests the conflation of sexual orientation with gender,"' given the still-prevailing stereotype that 
long hair is a feminine characteristic,and echoes the belief that feminized men are natural or likely 
targets of sexual attack while incarcerated!" 
Other justifications offered in support of hair length regulation in prison, such as reducing 
inmates' opportunities to conceal ~ontraband,"~ are apparently gender neutral. Female inmates 
have not ordinarily been subject to the same restrictions as their male counterparts, however. At 
least one state, while establishing very specific hair length standards for male prisoners, requires 
that females merely conform to "community standards" in this regard."' Male inmates have 
generally been unsuccessful in convincing courts that this differential treatment violates their right 
to equal protection under the law. One court, dismissively and without further explanation, simply 
categorized the security needs for male and female prisoners as "differen[t]."41 
,m. 
Just as courts have deferred to administrative determinations of penological interests in the 
prison context, they have also been largely deferential to school officials' perceptions of 
pedagogical interests!42 In a recent case, for example, the Supreme Court of Texas found that the 
state's non-discriminationstatute did not prevent its school districts from enforcing grooming codes 
"'See Valdes, supra note 7, at 5 1-55. 
'" See supra note 1 10; see also Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque B+ in the "Nascent Jurisprudence of 
Transsexualisrn," 4 Mich. I. Gender & L. 275, 308 ("Targets of sexual assault [in prison] are often young, 
effeminate and newly admitted."). 
See, e.g., Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 814. 
I" See Longstreth v. Maynard, 961 F.2d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1992) (referring to the Oklahoma Department of 
Corrections' Inmate Grooming Code). 
" I  Williams v. Wilkinson, 134 F.3d 373, 1997 WL 809971 at **4 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition). But cJ 
Rourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Services, 603 N.Y.S.2d 647,650 (upholding Native American correction 
officer's right to a religious exemption kom compliance with departmental hair length limitations, noting that 
purported state interest in strict uniformity was inconsistent with its application of different hair length standards to 
male and female officers). 
A 
i ~ 
'" Seegenerally, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-67 (1988). 
which treated males and females differentl~!~' The plaintiff, an eight-year-old boy, had been 
suspended from school for growing a slender "rat tail" which extended below his collar. No similar 
hair length limitation was imposed on girls!" The school principal specifically told the boy's 
mother "that the purpose of the rule was to enforce the notion that boys should look like boys and 
girls should look like girls."14s In turn, the court expressed concern that granting Toungate's 
discrimination claim would prevent schools from maintaining separate restroom facilities or 
"prohibit[ing] males from wearing dresses."'46 
The Harper case addressed exactly such a prohibition. After two high school students 
"cross-dressed" to attend their senior prom (she in a tuxedo, he in a dress and fur cape), school 
officials had them forcibly removed from the event. The students sued the school district on a 
number of grounds, including alleged violations of their constitutional rights to fkedom of 
7 
expression, due process, and equal protection of the laws.I4' A federal district court, however, 
rejected all their claims. "The school dress code does not differentiate based on sex. The dress 
code requires all students to dress in conformity with the accepted standards of the cornm~nity.'"~~ 
Further, the court found no "invidiously discriminatory animus" behind the officials' behavior since 
"[nleither homosexuals, nor transvestites, nor those in sympathy with them are a 'class' within the 
I" Board of Trustees of Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365,366 (Texas 1997) (citing TEX. CIV. 
F'RAC, & REM. CODE 9 106.001(a)). But cf Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.Supp. 13 19, 1333-34 (E.D. Texas 1993) (finding district grooming code limiting hair length 
of male students unconstitutional as applied to Native Americans whose religious beliefs required them to wear long 
hair). 
'"Id at 366-67. 
I" Id. at 375 (Spector, J., dissenting). 
'* Id. at 369 (citing Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 @.C. Cu. 1973)). 
'" Harperv. EdgewoodBd. ofEduc.,655 F.Supp. 1353,1354 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
Id at 1356. 
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meaning of [the statute regarding conspiracy to deny equal pr~tection.]"~" It saw fit to make this 
observation even though neither of the students evidently was alleged to have been a homosexual, a 
transvestiteor a "sympathizer" in any formal sense. 
C. Title VZI'O 
Even where an animus against sexual and gender minorities is established, those minorities 
may not always have protection against discrimination. This is certainly true in the employment 
context. A series of federal cases has established that transsexuals, like homosexuals, do not 
constitute a protected class under Title W anti-discrimination  provision^!^' According to the 
courts, "Title VII focuses on discrimination because of the status of sex or because of sexual 
stereotyping, rather than on discrimination due to a change in sex."ls2 In Ulane, the plaintiff pilot 
was left without a remedy for discrimination despite having received a new birth certificate under 
n 
Illinois law as well as a new FAA pilot's certificate acknowledging her as female. The court 
explained this by stressing that any discrimination against Ulane occurred "not because she is 
female, but because [she] is a tran~sexual.'"~ 
This jurisprudence has also been used to uphold employment discrimination based on less 
pronounced atypicalities. Thus, in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the court found no Title 
VII violation where the defendant admittedly refused to hire a qualified male job applicant because 
I5O Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. 55 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), as amended. 
"' E.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); 
Powell v. Read's, 436 F. Supp. 369,371 @. Md. 1977); Holloway v. Arhur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 
1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456,457 (N.D. Calif. 1975), affd570 F2d 354 (9th Cir. 
1978). See generally David M. Neff, Note, Denial of Title VZI Protection to Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 
IIIc., 34 DEPAULL. REV. 553 (1985). 
I" Powell, 436 F. Supp. at 371 (emphasisin original). 
A 
'" Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
the company interviewer found him Noting that "Congress by its proscription of 
sex discrimination intended only to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and females," the 
court distinguished Smith's circumstances from those of someone not hired because of a company 
preference for females!55 Similarly, Dodge v. Giant Food Znc. held that "Title VII was [not] 
intended to invalidate grooming regulations which have no significant effect upon the employment 
opportunities afforded one sex in favor of the other."lS6 These precedents effectively authorize 
discrimination based on atypical gender attributes, as opposed to sex status. 
The same reasoning adopted in Smith and Dodge has granted employers, like prisons and 
public schools, a great deal of leeway to require their employees to adhere to separate, sex-based 
dress codes and grooming standards. Male employees can be required to keep their hair short, for 
example, even though this expectation is rooted in stereotype!" Gender atypical women have 
9 
received somewhat greater protection than men, however. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the 
Court recognized that sex stereotyping is legally relevant to a finding of impermissible 
discrimination under Title VII.'58 Importantly, "the Court made its determination not by finding 
Hopkins was discriminated against because she was a woman, but because she was a woman who 
simply failed to exhibit the stereotypical characteristicsexpected of women."'59 Hopkins had been 
'"See, e.g., Tavora v. New Yo& Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907,908 (2d Cu. 1996). 
Is' 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (plurality opinion). Though the three dissenters emphasized their position that 
'Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping," they agreed that evidence of sex 
stereotyping by employers is "quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent." Id at 294 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
Is9 Kristine W .  Holt, Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title Vll, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a ,-, 
Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 Om. L. REV. 283,299 (1997). 
rehsed consideration for partnership a t  Price Waterhouse after being advised to "walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry."'60 
The Court's receptiveness to the claim in Hopkins depends on an inclusive reading of the 
term "sex," as used in Title VII. This reading broadens the concept of sex to include attributes of 
gender, offering the possibility of a remedy to those who have suffered discrimination based on 
their gender atypi~alities!~' Hopkim may be explicable as a manifestation of the special solicitude 
of the courts towards women in the workplace, asserted as a basis for denying relief to gender 
atypical men in Smith and Dodge and to transsexuals in cases such as Ho110woy.~~~ However, a 
unanimous Court has recently reafhned the proposition that "Title VII's prohibition of 
discrimination 'because o f .  . . sex' protects men as well as women."'63 This decision offers some 
-, 
hope that persons exhibiting "cross-gendered" behavior or attributes may receive greater protection 
in future cases than in the past.lM 
IW 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion) (quoting from the record below, 61 8 F.Supp. 1109, 11 17 (1985)). 
"I See Holt, supra note 159, at 296, 299-301. In thii context, the conflation of sex with gender benefits gender 
atypical plaintiffs. C' Franke, supra note 4 (arguing that the disaggregation of sex from gender in most Title VII, 
jursipmdence has perpetuated injustice towards transsexuals and inequality between men and women). 
16' CJ Holf supra note 159, at 301 ("At what point does a non-trangendered woman such as Hopkins, who wears no 
make-up or jewelry, curses, and interacts with others 'aggressively,' cross the line and become a transgendered man? 
. . . And at what point will the courts deny her protection under Title VII?"). 
I" Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sew., Inc., 118 S.Q. 998, 1001 (1998). This decision holds that same-sex sexual 
harassment can constitute actionable discrimination under Title VII. 
n, lM Compare one commentator's pre-Oncale observation that "[dliscrimination based upon gender role identity only 
exists in the presence of biological diversity." Franke, supra note 4, at 97. 
Transgendered and gender atypical plaintiffs may also find greater relief from 
discriminationunder state legislation than under Title vlI.I6* New York courts, for example, have 
consciously read that state's Civil Rights law more broadly than Title VII, despite substantial 
similarity between the two statutes!" The Maffei court found that the FTM plaintiff stated a valid 
discrimination claim under New York law, based on harassment he received at work. It criticized 
the federal precedents and observed that the state statute was intended to provide a "blanket 
description to eliminate all forms of discrimination, those then existing as well as any later 
de~ised."'~' It also predicated its decision explicitly on the language of "sex" rather than "sexual 
orientation." 
Although. . . a person may have both male and female characteristics, society only 
recognizestwo sexes. In the complaint plaintiff alleges that he is now a male based 
on his identity and outward anatomy. Being a transsexual male he may be 
considered part of a subgroup of men. There is no reason to permit discrimination 
against that subgroup under the broad antidiscriminationlaw of our City!68 
The court thus resigned itself to the binary model, but found a way to interpret it inclusively. 
Maffei is consistent with the only existing, on point New York precedent, Richards v. 
United States Tennis Association. Richard concerned the right of Dr. Renee Richards, formerly 
"an accomplished male tennis player," to participate in the United States Open as a woman 
following reassignment surgery; the tournament organizers required all women's divisions 
'" But see, e.g., Board of Trustees of Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365, 370 (E.D. Texas 
1998) (reading state civil rights statute narrowly, by analogy to Title VII, so as to uphold public school grooming 
code which treats males differently than females). 
Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). The court's argument rests 
principally on the New York City rather than State statute, but observes that they are similar in all important 
respects but one (the city law includes a provision prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation). Id at 
392. 
'" Id at 395 (quotingfiom Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights AppealBd, 41 N.Y.S.2d 84,86, 
89 (1976)). f7 
I" Id at 396. 
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I 
participants to pass a sex-chromatin test in order to play!69 The court found that this prerequisite 
violated the state Human Rights Law ahd decisively rejected the defendants' reliance on a 
chromosome test as an exclusive tool for determining sex!" "When an individual such as plaintiff, 
a successful physician, a husband and father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity to 
undergo a sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and misconceptions of defendants must give way 
to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now female.""' 
IV. Conclusion 
Clearly, the legal system has the capacity to recognize changes in sex status for both 
general and specific p~rposes."~ At the same time, it has often been reluctant to do so. This 
reluctance seems to be most readily overcome in cases of diagnosed transsexuals who have 
accomplished an anatomical change through surgery, and who have adopted traditional indices of 
P 
gender (e.g., name, clothing style) corresponding to that change. Transsexuals at an intermediate 
stage of physical transformation are far less likely to receive legal ackowledgement of their 
adopted sex. In addition, along with other gender atypical people such as transvestites or the 
"effeminate," transsexuals remain subject to the threat of discrimination and heightened legal 
pressure to conform to gendered community norms. The law resists ambiguity and continues to 
enforce the expectation that men will signal their maleness and women their femaleness by 
means of readily identifiable social indicators. It still fears "fraud." The law's inconsistent 
response to transsexuals and their needs perpetuates a legal limbo in which many ambiguities do 
'"40ON.Y.S.Zd267,268 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Id. at 272-73. 
"' Id at 272. 
n In Cf: Holt, supra note 159, at 298 ("The only certainty that can be distilled from this jumble of conflicting 
precedents is that sex is a legal function, not a biological function.") 
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remain unresolved. Similarly, gendered stereotypes continue to be upheld in some forums even 
?) 2- 
as they are discarded as "illegitimate"'73 in others. In the legal arena, gender is repeatedly both 
reconstructed and deconstructed. The resulting instability fosters a space in which the 
relationship of sex and gender will continue to be tested, and new boundaries mapped. 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 265-67 (O'Comor, I., p, 
concurring in the judgment). i 
.. 
